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ABSTRACT 
The Socratic elenchus is a procedure which tests out the consistency of  the interlocutors’ beliefs. 
To this end, it is necessary to carry out, alongside the renowned Socratic strategies (questioning, 
examples, definitions, etc.), also an emotional process acting inside reasoning and where shame 
has a leading role. The aporetic state is a good example of  the collaboration of  emotions and 
reasoning, growing from the shameful recognition of  contradictions. It is a cognitive and 
emotional acknowledgement of  errors that pushes the subject to transform his/her behaviour. 
The use of  emotions is not merely a rhetorical strategy for argumentation; emotions are the 
elements that embody knowledge into a practice capable of  transforming life into a good life 
thereby determining the rational way of  living for flourishing.  
The recognition of  mistakes does not happen just “in the head” but is “extended” in the public 
environment that permits the generation of  shame. This is the case, not only because shame is a 
“collective emotion” but because the audience is a necessary component of  the catharsis. 
My main thesis concerns what I call the “extended elenchus”, a process based on the extended 
nature of  the aporetic state. The first section highlights the “necessity thesis”, or the role of  
emotions in reasoning; the second focuses on shame as an epistemic emotion and on the 
cognitive role played by the audience in the implementation of  the “system of  shame”; the 
third addresses the role of  cathartic and zetetic aporia. 
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Introduction 
 
The Socratic elenchus is a procedure which tests out the consistency of  the 
interlocutors’ beliefs. To this end, it is necessary to carry out, alongside the 
                                                 
1 This paper arises from the project “Emotions First”, which I am carrying out at the 
University of  Edinburgh as a Marie Curie Research Fellow, thanks to a grant from the EU 
Commission. A previous version of  the paper was presented at the 2nd Annual Conference of  
The European Philosophical Society for the Study of  Emotions, University of  Edinburgh, 15-
17 July 2015. I would like to thank the organizers and those with whom I had the opportunity 
to discuss my approach, in particular Alessandra Fussi, John Dillon, Edwart Harcourt, Niels 
Hermannsson, Paolo Maccagno, Dory Scaltsas, Clerk Shaw, Jan Slaby and Luigi Vero Tarca. 
Their contribution enabled me to rethink and improve the first version of  the paper.  
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renowned Socratic strategies (questioning, examples, definitions, etc.), also an 
emotional process acting inside reasoning and where shame has a leading role. The 
dialogue takes the form of  a refutation, which is different from Eristic due to its 
moral purpose: thanks to the critique that it engenders, the dialogue enables the 
interlocutor to realize his own inferiority, to the extent that he must recognize 
that he does not really know what he thinks he knows. This feeling of  inferiority 
aims at inducing in him the desire to respond by changing his lifestyle, recognizing 
in himself  the truth he sought. Therefore, the Socratic refutation plays on the 
feeling of  shame that enables the interlocutor to admit his own ignorance.  
This aspect is crucial as shame played a fundamental role in Greek civilization. 
The Athenian citizen had to avoid all situations in which he could appear weak, or 
he was lost. But Socrates, arguing in the public square, does precisely that: he 
shows his interlocutors that they do not know what they think they know; he 
ridicules them and, above all, strips them of  their claims.  
My thesis is that the audience listening to the refutation was not a mere 
spectator but had an active role within an extended cognitive process that 
included Socrates, his interlocutors and the audience. This hypothesis, which I 
will explain in its main epistemological facets, is based on the recognition of  the 
particular historical period and of  the specific functioning of  the dialogues.  
Socratic dialogues were written not only by Plato but also by other writers.2 
They represent a particular form of  writing emerging in a period in which the oral 
performance was the most important. Based on the analysis of  this historical 
context, I think it is possible to claim not only that Socrates’ dialogues took place 
in the public square, but also that the dialogues written by Plato and by other 
disciples of  Socrates were performed and read in public.3 In writing the Socratic 
dialogues, Plato had in mind a specific and well defined external audience: an 
audience on which he wanted to impress a conceptual change, therefore a change 
in values and political approach. 
My main thesis concerns the existence of  what I call the “extended elenchus”, 
a process based on the extended nature of  the aporetic state as catharsis in the 
drama, and is grounded on various premises that I am going to explain in specific 
sections, providing also items of  textual evidence. The first section highlights the 
“necessity thesis” or the role of  emotions in reasoning; the second focuses on 
shame as an epistemic emotion and on the cognitive role played by the audience in 
the implementation of  the “system of  shame”; the third addresses the role of  
cathartic and zetetic aporia. 
 
 
                                                 
2 According to Livio Rossetti, we lost approximately 200 Socratic dialogues. Cf. Rossetti, L. 
2011.  Le dialogue socratique. Paris: Encre Marine, Editions Les Belles Lettres. 
3 Ryle, G.. 1966. Plato’s progress. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
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1. The Socratic method: emotions in reasoning 
 
My main and general thesis is that the awareness of  the role of  emotions in 
reasoning represents a cornerstone of  the Socratic method. I argue that the view 
that Socrates propounded is the reverse of  the so-called Socratic intellectualism:4 
emotion is the more primitive guide to the discovery of  the good, since it shows 
the way to reach knowledge, and has the power to transfer it into our lives.5 In this 
perspective, knowledge concerns every aspect of  life and reality.  Accordingly, not 
only do we reach knowledge through emotions, but emotions are also the powers 
through which knowledge can impact our lives.  
The elenchus aims at improving the interlocutor through a process of  
purification that is capable of  changing his whole existence: the goal of  the 
Socratic method is to give birth to a correct mode of  life, and, as we shall see, it is 
precisely the literary aspect of  Plato’s dialogues that makes this possible.6 The 
literary form allows us to understand the performance of  the dialogues: Plato was 
well aware7 that the diegetic-mimetic form of  the dialogues allowed the public to 
participate actively in the process. This participation does not mean, in my 
opinion, just that the audience could identify with the interlocutor, mirroring his 
emotional state, but also that the audience played a fundamental role in the entire 
cognitive process engendered by the dialogue. For this reason, the hypothesis of  
the extended mind and, more specifically, of  the extended emotions, as we shall 
see in detail in section 4, seems central for understanding this dynamic. 
Plato argued that emotions are necessary to reach the truth: emotions are not 
sufficient by themselves8 but – and in this perspective we can maintain a 
moderately rationalist approach – they act within reasoning to enhance the 
epistemic process. 
Plato was the first to explore and gain significant insights into the relation 
between emotions and reasoning: for instance, Plato’s Sophist 230b4-230e5 (the 
“noble sophistry” passage)9 clearly shows the bond between the logical and the 
                                                 
4 For a critique of  the paradigm of  Socratic intellectualism, cf. Brickhouse, T., and Smith N. 
2010. Socratic Moral Psychology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
5 For a defence of  this thesis, cf. Candiotto, L. 2012. Le vie della confutazione. I dialoghi socratici 
di Platone. Mimesis. 
6 For a literary analysis of  Platonic dialogues leading to a maieutic interpretation, cf. Gill, C. 
2006. “Le dialogue platonicien”. In: Brisson, L., Fronterotta, F. (eds.), Lire Platon. Paris: PUF, 
53-75. 
7 Cf. Plato, Resp. III, 395b sgg. 
8 On the problem concerning whether emotions be necessary or only sufficient to produce a 
moral judgement, see Sauer, H. 2012. “Are Emotions Necessary and Sufficient for Moral 
Judgment?”. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15:95–115. 
9 For a detailed comment on this passage, cf. Candiotto, L., “Purification through emotions. The 
role of  shame in Plato’s Sophist 230b4-e5”. In: in  Dillon, J., Zovko, M. L. (eds.),  Proceedings of  
the International Conference Bildung and paideia: Philosophical Models of  Education, special 
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emotional levels that can be found in the Socratic elenchus. 
In this passage it is possible to isolate a quotation which proves the extension 
of  the cognitive process: Plato argues that the release is sweet for those who 
attend as listeners and is firmly established for those who undergo the process (the 
refutation). Besides indicating the presence of  an audience, this passage 
demonstrates how the action of  the elenchus affects also the listeners of  the 
dialogue. 
Refutation brings the interlocutor to the aporetic state, understandable as an 
embodied and embedded experience of  mistakes, the first step for grasping the 
truth. The aporetic state is a good example of  the collaboration of  emotions and 
reasoning, growing from the shameful recognition of  contradictions. It is a 
cognitive and emotional acknowledgement of  errors that pushes the subject to 
transform his behaviour. The use of  emotions is not merely a rhetorical strategy 
for argumentation; emotions are the elements that embody knowledge into a 
practice capable of  transforming life into a good life, thereby determining the 
rational way of  living for flourishing.  
In order to be complete, the elenctic purification needs also a psychological 
cleansing: in this perspective, it can be obtained only through the collaboration 
between rationality and emotions,  mainly shame. Socrates uses shame as a tool 
for healing the illness of  one’s soul and style of  life. That is the effect that 
Socrates aims to achieve through the elenchus, namely the state of  aporia of  the 
interlocutor. The aporia is a mental state of  perplexity and being at a loss, that 
involves feelings, which in turn play a role in the cognitive development of  the 
interlocutor. The aporetic state is not a purely cognitive state; it is a cognitively-
motivational state involving emotive elements.  
The turning point between the refutation and the maieutical production of  
the thesis consists in the acknowledgement of  one’s own inadequacy, a sense of  
inferiority – a situation that is captured by the Greek terms aidos and aischyne 
and which unfolds as an aporetic condition, in other words as awareness of  
contradiction The recognition of  mistakes does not happen just “in the head” but 
is “extended” in the public environment that permits the generation of  shame. 
Frustration and the feeling of  shame as a result of  the dialogic challenge is thus 
experienced by Socrates, by the interlocutor and by the audience. 
 
 
 
_________________________________________ 
issue of  the journal Educational Philosophy and Theory, Routledge, forthcoming. 
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2. The central role of  the audience for the dynamics of  shame 
 
Arguably, the kind of  shame pursued by Socrates as a factor of  elenctic 
transformation represents a productive social use of  the “system of  shame”, 
adopting the distinction proposed by Bernard Williams between a positive and a 
negative shame.10  
Shame is often defined as a primitive emotion: it plays a fundamental role in 
the way our personal identity is constructed through relationships with others 
(both with peers and hierarchically). In Greek times, dialogues were not for the 
most part private, but more often public conversations. Acceptance of  the 
refutation therefore had a social value, given the way in which social status was 
constitutive of  individual identity. In this perspective, accepting a public 
refutation could imply accepting a change of  identity. 
However, Plato’s dialogues only rarely give testimony of  a successful 
transformation occurring in the interlocutor. This is due to the interlocutor’s 
attitude towards shame: the feeling of  shame can be accepted as a means for self-
transformation or hidden to protect a social status. Shame is frequently concealed 
(through the psychological mechanism of  the “shame of  shame”) due to social 
reasons. 
In Euthyphro (12b4-c1), Socrates argues that where there is shame there is also 
fear of  losing face, and we blush for this reason. What makes us blush is the fear 
of  losing our reputation or, conversely, as Socrates says literally, of  acquiring the 
“reputation of  an evil man” (12c1). Shame is in fact experienced in front of  other 
men (15d4-e2). 
The interlocutor’s identity depends on social recognition, namely the social 
attribution of  a role; therefore, the interlocutor can hardly accept to forego this 
safe foothold by openly admitting his errors.  Arguably, by outlining the 
distinction between these two types of  shame, it is possible to notice how the 
purification of  the interlocutor implies a turning – or “break” – point within the 
dialogue, which influences the epistemic outcome of  the aporia. Shame as a tool 
of  transformation conduces to the generative phase of  the maieutic process and 
shame as an obstacle to transformation that functions as a resonator for the 
audience.  
In Charmides we find, embodied by Charmides and Critias, the expression of  
these two different ways of  experiencing shame. Modesty is connected with shame 
when Charmides blushes as he does not know whether or not he is wise: thanks to 
shame, Charmides recognizes his own inadequacy, accepting – at least at the age 
when he is represented in the dialogue – that he should be accompanied by 
                                                 
10 Williams, B. 1993. Shame and Necessity. Berkeley-Los Angeles: University of  California Press. 
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Socrates in the research. Critias’ shame,11 however, hinders the research, as it 
triggers a defence mechanism that causes Critias not to admit his shortcomings. 
In passage 164 d Critias says he is not ashamed to admit his mistakes; however, 
subsequently he fails to realize what he had set out to do. As a result of  the 
inconsistency between words and deeds, and of  the inability to admit the 
condition of  being in aporia, Critias does not admit that he does not know. 
Therefore, he is unable to make the first step towards a sincere research: he does 
not recognize his own ignorance. As we can see, shame, depending on the 
character and the social role of  the interlocutor, can either engender or hinder the 
process of  research.  
The concealment of  shame, however, is not an evidence of  the failure of  the 
Socratic method, which uses shame as a tool for transformation. On the contrary, 
Plato uses the defence of  the interlocutor (the way he conceals shame) as an 
element that, thanks to the involvement of  the audience, backfires on the 
interlocutor himself. 
Emotions collaborate with reason not only to purify the soul, but to deliver a 
message to the audience: the necessity to be aware of  the inadequacy of  
contemporary politicians and teachers.  When interlocutors try to protect their 
social image, their standing is unavoidably compromised. By trying to save face, 
they lose face. More specifically, interlocutors cannot protect their socially ratified 
identities insofar as, by attempting to do so, they demonstrate their unwillingness 
to admit their errors. The audience, realizing that the interlocutor does not 
acknowledge the shortcomings which, thanks to the refutation, emerged clearly in 
the dialogue, understands that he is not the person he believes himself  to be. This 
mechanism, which I call “outreach elenchus”, occurs mainly when the 
interlocutors are politicians, sophists, and rhetors. In the outreach elenchus 
Socrates carries out directly the refutation of  the interlocutor, but the elenchus 
affects indirectly also the audience.  
In other words, this elenchus increases in size and incorporates the dialogic 
context, like a stone thrown in a pond that produces a series of  increasingly larger 
circles. This mechanism, however, as we will be explaining in detail in section 4 by 
emphasizing its extension, demonstrates not only the effect of  the Socratic 
intervention on the audience, but also the role the public plays in the refutation, 
functioning as a resonator and leading back the refutation to Socrates’ 
interlocutor. 
In this perspective, the movement of  the refutation is not just similar to that 
of  a stone thrown into a pond, but also to that of  a boomerang, which comes back 
to those who have launched it and which, when used for hunting, allows the 
                                                 
11 Platone, Charm. 169 c-d.  
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hunter to hit an object whilst apparently being thrown towards a different 
direction. In this sense we could say that when Socrates points indirectly to the 
public, he does so in order to hit his direct interlocutor: he just needs the active 
participation of  the public, which allows the boomerang to bounce back. The 
movements exemplified here represent the cognitive and emotional dynamics that 
develop between Socrates, the interlocutor and the audience, and that find their 
realization in a specific moment of  Socratic dialogue, the aporetic state. 
A clear example of  this mechanism is present in the Gorgias and, in particular, 
in the figure of  Callicles.12 In 461 c Polus says that Gorgias was ashamed to 
maintain certain statements, e.g. that he did not know what justice was and that, 
as he did not know, he could not teach it. The shame that is ascribed to Gorgias is 
therefore caused by the recognition of  ignorance; Polus himself, later, will become 
a victim of  the mechanism of  shame by recognizing that, had he expressed his 
thoughts, he would have fallen into contradiction. Callicles, however, manages to 
avoid these consequences – the recognition of  ignorance and contradiction – 
exposing accurately the Socratic strategies and individuating in which point of  
the dialogue Polus gave in and “found himself  entrapped in your discourses and 
could no longer open his mouth, ashamed to say what he was thinking”.   
Callicles is not ashamed as he does not identify with the values13 that are at 
the basis of  the critique – this is why Socrates had to use another strategy with 
him, which is based on the extension of  the elenchus. In my perspective, the 
tenacity of  Socrates in continuing his dialogue with Callicles is not moved by the 
hope of  changing his lifestyle – this interpretation would ascribe to Socrates a 
certain naivety – but by the attempt to express explicitly the consequences of  
such a vision and lifestyle, in order for the listeners and the audience to realize 
Callicles’ shortcomings and to rebound onto Callicles a critique that compromises 
his image. 
These tools are not specific to every Socratic elenchus, but Socrates uses the 
public as a vehicle for the extension of  the elenchus when he is dealing with those 
who represent the values of  the society he wants to criticize. Accordingly, my 
claim is not that all the elenchi are extended, but that it is necessary to recognize 
the existence of  this particular form of  elenchus. The Socratic elenchus is 
contextual and is configured into different ways according to Socrates’ strategic 
purposes.14 
                                                 
12 For a detailed analysis of  the dialogue according to this paradigm cf. Candiotto, L. 2014. 
“Elenchos public et honte dans la troisième partie du Gorgias de Platon”, CHORA. Revue 
d’études anciennes et médiévales, 12: 191-212. 
13 According to Adkins, this is a fundamental aspect for realizing the experience of  shame. Cf. 
Adkins, A. W. H., 1970. From the Many to the One. A Study of  Personality and Views of  Human 
Nature in the Context of  Ancient Greek Society, Values and Beliefs. London: Constable. 
14 For our study, it is important to highlight how these changes impact also on the emotional 
aspect of  the dialogue. Cf. Brisson, L. 2001. “Vers un dialogue apaisé. Les transformations 
LAURA CANDIOTTO 
 
226 
 
This interpretation could be criticized by referring to another passage in the 
Gorgias15 where Socrates tells Polus that there are two types of  elenchus, the 
rhetorical elenchus, which is usually used in courts, and the dialectic elenchus, the 
type used by Socrates. The sharp distinction between these two types of  elenchus 
lies in the fact that, to have value, the first needs a large number of  witnesses, 
whilst for the second to succeed it is sufficient that a single witness recognizes the 
truth. This difference is linked to the specificity of  the Socratic maieutics, which 
addresses each time a single interlocutor, and to Socrates’ refusal to seek consensus 
and approval from large audiences, as did the orators and politicians of  the time. 
The objection would thus emphasize the fact that Socrates’ intervention is usually 
directed to a single party.  
I would reply to this objection by highlighting how the difference between 
rhetoric and dialectic elenchus is not only methodological, but also related to the 
Platonic construction of  Socrates’ public role, which should be understood in 
opposition to the masters and politicians of  his time.16 
Plato is aware that the elenchus has an effect on the listeners, he even uses the 
audience to induce the elenchus to bounce back on the interlocutor.  However, he 
does not unmask this mechanism for two reasons: firstly, because he is drawing 
Socrates’ image in contrast with that of  the masters of  the time, and secondly 
because he wants the strategy to be successful (if  the rules of  the game were 
revealed they would lose their effectiveness). Moreover, it is also true that Socrates 
seeks the consent of  only one individual: to do this, however, he needs the active 
participation of  the public in the aporetic state. In so doing, he obtains also the 
political and rhetorical effect that Plato could not ascribe to Socrates, given the 
apologetic construction of  his figure.  
 
 
3. Aporetic state 
 
According to Anne-Marie Bowery shame, which is linked to the physical reaction 
of  blushing, indicates exactly the aporetic state and the difficulty of  recognizing 
what has been discovered. The interlocutors blush when they have to admit what 
they would rather not admit, or when they do not know how to respond. 
According to Bowery, the phenomenon of  blushing indicates a turning point of  
_________________________________________ 
affectant la pratique du dialogue dans le corpus platonicien”. In Cossutta, F., Narcy, M., eds., La 
forme dialogue chez Platon: Évolution et réceptions,  209-226. Grenoble: Éditions Jérôme Millon. 
15 Plato, Gorg. 471e-472c. 
16 On Plato’s construction of  Socrates’ character, cf. my article: Candiotto, L. 2013. “Socrate e 
l’educazione dei giovani aristocratici. Il caso di Crizia come esempio di mascheramento operato 
dai difensori socratici”. In F. de Luise, A. Stavru, eds., Socratica III. Studies on Socrates, the 
Socratics, and the Ancient Socratic Literature, 190-198. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag. 
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the dialogue, the emergence of  real possibilities for a dialogic development.17 
In relation to the aporetic state, it is also important to remember that the 
Socratic method does not reach a stable definition but, in a Daedalic fashion,18 it 
puts in motion all the notions proposed by the interlocutor in order to lead him to 
recognize his own ignorance. In my view such an outcome, often considered as a 
skeptic one, should not be understood as an epistemic failure: the object of  the 
method was not to attain a stable definition – as in the case of  Prodicus’ method – 
but to carry over  the purification from error, which can be achieved only through 
conceptual contradiction and becoming ashamed of  oneself. The Socratic method, 
despite having a strong sophistic connotation in the use of  linguistic and 
rhetorical strategies, could therefore be turned against the sophists themselves, 
who could be accused of  selling a knowledge that was not as stable as they 
claimed. The aporetic outcome of  the Socratic method can thus be understood as 
a place in which rationality comes to a standstill, where the paradox replaces firm 
knowledge and contradiction serves as the best medication against the assumption 
of  wisdom. Exactly in its negativity aporia provides the consciousness of  errors as 
the necessary starting point to wisdom. In this way, aporia is not only cathartic, 
as pointed out by the traditional approach, but also zetetic. The zetetic aporia 
underlines how solving particular aporiai is part of  the search for knowledge. This 
conception of  aporiai as puzzles to be solved is not only central for Aristotle (i.e. 
Met. B1. 995a34–b1) but also meaningful for the Socratic elenchus.19 The 
roadblock is also “a breakthrough (euporia), pointing to the right direction in 
which to pursue an answer to the question posed by the dialogue”.20 
Studies on the so-called epistemic emotions are central to the cognitive 
phenomenon we are describing: they highlight how emotions – being conceptually 
vital, and emerging in the course of  a practically motivated enquiry – are 
necessary for thinking. One aim of  this paper is to demonstrate how, in the 
Socratic method, the feeling of  shame, connected to the above-mentioned aporetic 
status, represents also an epistemic emotion.21 Socrates was persuaded that deep 
                                                 
17 A. M. Bowery, “Know Thyself: Socrates as Storyteller”, in G. A. Scott (ed.), Philosophy in 
dialogue. Plato’s Many Devices, University Park 2007, pp. 82-110. 
18 On the Socratic method as a Daedalic method cf. Platone, Euthphr. 11 b 6-8, Alc. I, 121 a3, 
Men. 97 d 6. See Candiotto, L. 2011, «Il metodo adatto per Eutifrone: una calma distanza», 
Peitho. Examina antiqua 1(2), 39-55,  in particular  48. 
19 According to Vasilis Politis it is necessary to distinguish these two types of  aporia, 
highlighting the point that only the second one refers to puzzlement in itself  and, therefore, to 
the significance of  the question as the main drive for  the research (see p. 107-109).  Politis, V. 
2006.  “Aporia and Searching in the Early Plato”. In J. Lindsay, V. Karasmanis, eds., 
Remembering Socrates: Philosophical Essays, 88-109. Oxford-New York: Clarendon Press. 
20 Gerson, L. P. 2009. Ancient Epistemology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 44. 
21 Cf. analysis of  epistemic guilt in relation to accountability in Morton, A. 2010. «Epistemic 
Emotions», in P. Goldie (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of  Philosophy of  Emotions, 385-399. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 395-396. 
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beliefs revealed by shame were true beliefs about what was right or not right to 
do22: shame played therefore a central role in the practice of  wisdom.  
The Platonic paradigm of  knowledge as a vision (originating from the 
attribution of  ideas as object of  noein) cannot be found in the Socratic method, 
except as its negation: as a matter of  fact, the  Socratic discourse leads to a  non-
vision, to the incapability to see a way out (cf. the etymology of  aporia) for 
thought. However, the value of  the Socratic elenchus should be grasped 
intrinsically and in its radicalism: its possible positive value should not be sought 
in the generation of  further knowledge (although this process does take place with 
the transition from elenchus to maieutics), but in the way it engenders an ethic of  
care that is able to transform the recognition of  powerlessness in the constant 
search for good deeds. It is necessary to emphasize this aspect in order to grasp 
the intrinsic epistemic valence of  the elenchus, which should not be considered 
only as a pre-condition to reach a subsequent state of knowledge. The aporetic 
outcome of  the elenchus, therefore, should not be understood in a passive sense: 
the strength of  the aporetic event requires a transformative process that allows us 
to find, within negativity itself, the key to imagine an otherness. 
 
 
4. The extended elenchus 
 
The study of  the primary role of  emotions in the Socratic elenchus, as well as the 
research on the epistemic nature of  shame and on the zetetic character of  
purification through aporia, allow me to propose the thesis that the Socratic 
elenchus is extended.  
This means that not only the purpose of  the Socratic elenchus is external (e.g. in 
relation to  lifestyle), but also its genesis.  
I argue that the aporetic state is achieved in the elenchus, not only in the 
interlocutor’s mental state; the state is the conclusion of  the elenchus that is a 
shared cognitively-motivational state of  both interlocutors, Socrates and the 
dialogue-partner. My position is that the elenctic aporia is the external shared 
dialogical embodiment of  the cognitively-motivational state of  the two 
interlocutors in a Socratic elenchus. 
The theory I employ for explaining the shared state achieved through the 
elenchus is the theory of  the extended mind23 and of  the extended emotions. 
The theory of  the extended mind – a form of  active externalism, for which the 
environment constantly drives one’s intellect in an ongoing way – refers mainly to 
the way in which the human mind extends itself  in external technologies: 
                                                 
22 Moss, J. 2005. “Shame, Pleasure and the Divided Soul”, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 
XXIX: 137-170. 
23 Clark, A., and Chalmers  D. 1998. “The extended mind”. Analysis 58: 10-23. 
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although this would seem to be very far from the classical age, I believe that 
Socrates “was using” the audience in the same way as today’s mind “uses” 
technologies, for a well-defined cognitive purpose: not only the purification from 
false beliefs, but also (and here we see the need for externalization of  the cognitive 
phenomenon) to bounce back to the interlocutor a conceptual shift concerning his 
role. According to this model we regulate ourselves through other people: they are 
there “for me”, they are resources which I use instrumentally, for my own self. 
Socrates uses the audience to achieve his objectives: an extended conceptual 
change, able to impact the ethical and political behaviour of  the audience. The 
cognitive extension takes place especially via the affective channel: in this 
perspective, I think the configuration of  the extended mind as extended emotions 
is even better recognized as a conceptual paradigm for understanding the 
phenomenon of  the aporetic state. Extended emotions are therefore part of  the 
Socratic method: Socrates uses them as a strategy and a tool to achieve the 
aporetic status and, through it, a cognitive transformation. 
The theory of  extended emotions proposed by Jan Slaby24 goes in the direction 
of  “collective emotions”, to be intended both as emotions “common” among the 
members of  a group, and as emotions constituted by all the members of  a group 
at the same time. For this aspect it is fundamental to refer to Printz’s work,25 even 
though Slaby holds his distance from the perceptual framework and emphasizes 
the rich phenomenology of  affective states, drawing on Helm in regard to the 
systematic interrelatedness of  the instances of  momentary feeling,26 and attaining 
the concept of   “phenomenally extended emotions”.27 Slaby proposes examples of  
emotions which are very significant for our theme: in his opinion it is possible to 
encounter extended emotions not only in the general social-interactive domain, 
but also in the context of  art reception and in dialogical interplay. 
For Adam Carter, Emma Gordon and Orestis Palermos28 emotions extend 
beyond the agent’s body to aspects of  its dynamic environment. Their proposal is 
to understand the hypothesis of  extended emotions as a novel application of  the 
hypothesis of  extended cognition, claiming that, if  understood within this 
conceptual paradigm, their characterization is less radical. Their defence depends 
                                                 
24  Slaby, J. 2014. “Emotions and the Extended Mind”. In: Salmela, M., von Scheve, C., eds., 
2014. Collective Emotions, 32-46. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
25 Prinz, J. 2004. “Emotions Embodied”. In Solomon, R., ed. Thinking about Feeling: 
Philosophers on Emotions, 1-14. New York: Oxford University Press.  
26 In “Relational Affect” (paper delivered at the 2nd Annual Conference of  The European 
Philosophical Society for the Study of  Emotions, University of  Edinburgh, 15-17 July 2015) 
Slaby underlines however how, differently from Helm, he assumes that the relational affect is 
from the outset transindividual. 
27 Slaby, J.. 2014, 42. 
28 Carter, J. A., Gordon, E. C., and Palermos, S. O. Forthcoming. “Extended emotion”, 
Philosophical Psychology. 
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therefore on the justification of  the hypothesis of  extended cognition. 
For our analysis about the cognitive process pursued by the Socratic elenchus, 
it is enough to highlight here that knowledge does not just happen “in the head” 
of  the interlocutor but is “extended” in the public environment, and this allows 
the generation of  shame. It is not only a question of  location but also of  
determining the type of  knowledge that is realized: such knowledge is not just 
“shared” with both the speaker and the audience; it is also extended in the sense 
of  enhanced or maximized.29 This also clarifies how the regulation of  the self  
always involves the other. Shame is really experienced also by the audience; it is 
not a “fictional shame”. Not only because shame is a “public emotion” but 
because the public and dialogical context is a necessary component of  the 
catharsis, through what I call “outreach elenchus”,  i.e. the public act of  
purification, which I have already described in its essential features in the section 
devoted to that topic.  
Therefore, Socrates, his interlocutors and the audience form a group: to 
understand this aspect we must remember that the audience of  the Socratic 
dialogues is not a generic set of  listeners, but a very specific audience that 
Socrates wants to influence using the instrument of  the outreach elenchus to 
trigger an extended elenchus. The audience is composed of  the Athenian 
intelligentsia, a group that has a great weight in the political constitution of  
morals and customs. As claimed by Williams, one does not depend on generic 
others, but only on a few others, those whose way of  judging is shared by the 
agent.30 The cognitive dynamic underlying the outreach elenchus is that of  an 
extended elenchus, which expresses the externalization of  mind and emotions. 
The fact that Socrates aims his method – albeit indirectly – at the audience 
enables us to grasp not only the embodiment of  knowledge, but mainly its 
external origin: by bouncing back the elenchus towards the interlocutor, the 
audience makes it more powerful. This process takes on not only a political and 
educational valence towards the audience, but also a cognitive and epistemic 
significance. It is a synergic process of  transformation of  both the subject and the 
environment. In particular, I would like to stress that this kind of  elenchus not 
only purifies the audience, but it affects also the interlocutors who are the object 
of  the confutation: it bounces back and obliges them to recognize the shame they 
had concealed. Socrates “uses” the interlocutors to ensure that the message he 
sends them - through the aporetic state experienced by Socrates himself  and by 
the interlocutor - goes back enhanced. 
Andy Clark  describes the cognitive process as “the actual local operations that 
                                                 
29 Clark, A. 2008. Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension. New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
30 For an analysis of  these terms in Alcibiades’ speech in the Symposium of  Plato, cf. De Luise, 
F. 2013. “Alcibiade e il morso di Socrate: un caso di coscienza”. Thaumàzein 1: 187-205. 
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realize certain forms of  human cognizing include inextricable tangles of  feedback, 
feed-forward and feed-around loops: loops that promiscuously criss-cross the 
boundaries of  brain, body and world”.31 The movement that I described 
previously, referring to the expansion of  circles on the water produced by a stone 
thrown in a pond, and to the trajectory of  a boomerang, which has the ability is 
to turn back and to hit an object without being thrown at it directly, should 
therefore be understood within this wide, circular process of  continuous entries 
and exits, intersections and links between the mind, the body and the world. 
Furthermore, the circularity of  this process is expressed by the movement of  the 
boomerang: aerodynamic forces generate a twisting moment that causes the 
‘gyroscope’ to proceed and to move on a circular path. 
Moreover, the emphasis on the cathartic connotation of  aporia within the 
paradigm of  extensive knowledge allows us to understand how such connotation 
does not imply a passive stance but defines an immediately active source of  
knowledge, reinforcing therefore the active externalism model. 
Therefore, the distinction between cathartic aporia and zetetic aporia we 
mentioned earlier,  referring to the interpretation of  Politis,  should be considered 
as an expression of  the strength of  aporia as a tool of  extended knowledge. Shame 
is generated and has effects in the “society of  dialogue”.32  
This emotional knowledge is realizable just in the shared and cathartic setting 
of  the drama. 
According to Aristotle, rhetoric favours working on logos in order to lead to 
the truth (representing a technique of  persuasion through logos) but, by doing 
this, it does not negate the possibility of  using the emotional dimension to 
influence the audience.33 
Moreover, Aristotle was the first to identify extended emotions in the practice 
of  dramatic catharsis and to point to its significance and value for society. He 
analysed the role of  tragedy in the theatre, showing that the tragic events in a 
play are acted out in the feelings of  the audience. The embodiment of  the 
emotions in the engagement of  the audience with the tragic plot becomes a 
deliberative corrective in the audience, balancing their feelings of  pity, anger and 
fear, in the light of  the conceived calamity. The Socratic elenchus is staged by 
Plato in performative settings, and is a carefully crafted counterpoise between 
arguments and feelings in social reasoning interactions. Both practices, as 
analysed by these great philosophers, give us profound understanding of  the 
interplay and mutual support of  emotions and reasoning resulting in knowledge 
and cognition. 
                                                 
31 Clark, A. 2007. “Curing Cognitive Hiccups: A Defense of  the Extended Mind”. The Journal of  
Philosophy, 104: 163-192, 164. 
32 Vidal-Naquet, P. 1990. La démocratie grecque vue d’ailleurs, Paris: Flammarion.  
33 Aristotle, Rhet., book II. 
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Conclusion 
 
At the core of  wisdom – which is the main purpose of  the Socratic practice and, 
therefore, needs to be understood as practical reasoning – there are emotions, seen 
as forces capable of  directing actions towards the good of  the individual and of  
the context in which he operates.34 Nevertheless, we should not think that only 
“positive” emotions can be a source of  improvement in personal and collective life. 
This paper has attempted to demonstrate, as an outcome which is secondary to 
the one referring to the extended elenchus, how “negative” aspects of  shame and 
the aporetic state may acquire a positive meaning insofar as they enable us to 
transform our unquestioned knowledge of  reality.  Notably, the most effective 
form of  purification for human knowledge is accessible in a dialogic context, in a 
situation which implies relations with others. In this perspective the extended 
elenchus takes shape  within a conception of  extended cognition, where a primary 
role is played by collective emotions. In fact, the elenchus is the main strategy of  
the Socratic dialogue, which – albeit often unfolding as a dialogue between two 
individuals – implies also the presence of  listeners who serve as source and 
receptacle for the process of  purification. 
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